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Abstract 
In the extensive literature that has been dedicated during the past fifteen years to 
the comparative analysis of the welfare states, a significant number of studies 
have focused on the identification of the ideal regimes or types, in addition to their 
empirical validation. The celebrated work, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
by Esping-Andersen (1990) constituted the point of departure for a vigorous 
academic debate which, as a response to some of the criticisms that were raised by 
the study, led to the construction of various alternative typologies, as well as a 
prodigious output of empirical studies aiming to identify what is termed in the 
present paper, real types. This paper seeks to contribute to the discussion on the 
current state of knowledge with regard to the differences and similarities in the 
welfare states following the scientific contributions made over the past fifteen 
years. Two general conclusions emerge in particular: firstly, that the diversity of 
typologies has not contributed to the desired clarification; and secondly, that the 
results of the studies are inconclusive, both with regard to the precise number of 
real types of welfare state – despite the fact that all of them confirm the existence 
of at least three types – and to the classification of the countries concerned. The 
existence of significant divergences, and even of contradictory results, highlights 
the need for continued research. However, rather than simply constructing new 
typologies, it is necessary to incorporate into empirical analyses a temporal 
evaluation of the effects of the reforms introduced in the welfare states. 
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In the extensive literature that has been dedicated during the past fifteen years to the 
comparative analysis of the welfare states, a significant number of studies have focused on 
the identification of the ideal regimes or types, in addition to their empirical validation. The 
celebrated work, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, by Esping-Andersen (1990) 
constituted the point of departure for a vigorous academic debate which has continued right 
up to the present day. In spite of the work’s acknowledged merits, among which is the 
conceptualisation of the welfare state in terms of different regimes, various criticisms have 
been raised. The most intensely debated of these have been the classification of certain 
countries, the analytical focus on cash benefits, the omission of gender-dimension (not 
analysed in this paper) and, most recently, the very concept of regime. The divergence in 
relation to the number of regimes – and thus, the classification of various countries – gave 
rise to five typologies (Leibfried 1992; Castles and Mitchell 1993; Ferrera 1996a; Bonoli 
1997; Korpi and Palme 1998).    
 
The first part of the present paper comprises the presentation and critical analysis of some 
of the ideal typologies. A summary of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) ´three worlds`, in addition 
to some of the main critiques expressed against the latter, is complemented by Esping-
Andersen’s (1999) commentary and revised classification, which were omitted in the 
literature. The proposals of Ferrera, Bonoli and Korpi and Palme were selected from among 
the above-mentioned typologies: the first two sought to “correct” Esping-Andersen’s 
typology by means of the identification of a fourth regime encompassing the Southern 
European countries; the third and more ambitious work aimed to identify five institutional 
welfare state models. The various solutions, in terms of clusters, are all compared with each 
other and with reference to the ´three worlds`, in order to identify differences and 
similarities.    
 
However, besides the theoretical debate, an extensive number of empirical studies have 
been published with the objective of identifying those regimes which we refer to in this 
paper as ‘real’. The second part of this paper presents a summary of thirteen empirical 
studies, all carried out between 1994 and 2005, which have been selected on the basis of 
their diversity in terms of analytical focus, methodological options and the time horizon of 
each analysis. Although the thirteen studies are presented in chronological order, they 
could also have been arranged according to their main objectives, namely, to test the  
Esping-Andersen typology (Ragin, 1994; Kangas, 1994; Obinger and Wagschal, 1998; 
Wildboer Schut et al., 2001; Powell and Barrientos, 2004); to verify the existence of a 
fourth and/or fifth welfare state regime for the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe, 
respectively (Saint Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; MacMenamim, 2003; Soede et al., 2004; 
Ferreira and Figueiredo, 2005); finally, to test the robustness of the ´three worlds` through 
the analysis of other domains of State intervention (Kautto, 2002; Gal, 2004; Bambra, 
2005a,b). In a further stage, the findings of the studies are compared, in terms of the 
number and composition of the clusters, both among each other and with the ideal 
typologies, particularly with Esping-Andersen’s classification.  
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A final evaluation will permit us to draw conclusions as to whether or not such a 
substantial theoretical and empirical output has contributed to the clarification of 
divergences and the unequivocal confirmation of the classification of the majority of 
countries. To summarise, the intention is to verify whether the intense debate of the past 
fifteen years has served to contribute decisively to a greater knowledge of the differences 
and similarities among the welfare states in the various continents, in particular those in 
Europe.  
 
2. The theoretical ideal types   
2.1. The ´three worlds` of Esping-Andersen 
 
Over the past fifteen years, many researchers have attempted to provide answers to two 
central questions: firstly, how do the welfare states differ from and resemble each other? 
Secondly, can they be classified into different ideal-types and if so, how? 
 
The publication of the celebrated work, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism by Esping-
Andersen (1990), which continues today to be regarded as a reference work, in spite of the 
diverse critiques that it has generated, initiated an intense academic debate which 
Abrahamson (1999) has described as the ‘welfare modelling business’.  
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) found that little attention had previously been directed towards the 
study of the welfare state itself, a position which is evident in the question that he starts out 
by formulating thus: “If welfare states differ, how do they differ? And when, indeed is a 
state a welfare state?”(p.18). Having opted to approach the concept of the welfare state 
from the perspective of political economy, rather than from that of the social programmes 
in themselves, he acknowledged the following limitation:  
 
 “The broader approach implies a trade-off. Since our intention is to understand the ´big 
picture`, we shall not be able to dwell on the detailed characteristics of the various social 
programmes. (...) A related trade-off is that large comparisons, such as ours, prohibit detailed 
treatments of individual countries”. (p.2)1  
 
However, the above questions also included his criticism of the conceptualisation of 
welfare states in terms of social expenditure, because: “expenditures are epiphenomenal to 
the theoretical substance of the welfare state” (p.19). For both reasons, Esping-Andersen 
organised his analysis around the concept of the welfare state regime - not simply the 
welfare state – arguing that: “to talk of a ´regime` is to denote the fact that in the relation 
between state and economy, a complex of legal and organisational features is 
                                                 
1 It is of interest to note that Esping-Andersen admitted that “readers knowledgeable of any of the 18 nations 
included in the study, will feel that my treatment of ´their` country is superficial, if not outright 
misrepresentative” (1990:2).   
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systematically interwoven” (p.2).2  In order to define a welfare regime, Esping-Andersen 
used two major dimensions: i) the level of decommodification, that is, the degree to which 
one can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living without reliance on the market; and 
ii) the type of stratification, that is, how and to what extent welfare systems differ in the 
structuring of social citizenship. 
 
Based on the above criteria, he identifies three ideal types or regimes – liberal, conservative 
and social-democratic – each differing with respect to the historical and political 
development in various societies.3 
 
The Liberal Regime is characterised by reliance on the market. It provides support only to 
those in need, i.e., those who are unable to meet their basic requirements in any other way. 
Entitlements rules are strict and stringent means-testing is used to determine the level of 
benefit, which tends to be a ´minimal subsistence level`. There are no separate collective 
provisions for specific occupational groups (apart from civil servants’ schemes). The 
collective provision is funded from taxation. The state encourages the market solution by 
guaranteeing only a minimum and by the tax system making the market the key institution. 
Consequently, the degree of decommodification is low. In terms of stratification, this 
regime promotes a clear distinction between state-welfare recipients and the rest of the 
population. 
 
The Conservative Regime places the family at the centre of welfare provision. It is 
characterised by a large number of different social insurance schemes for different 
occupational groups (with special schemes for civil servants). Entitlements rules are fairly 
strict and are based on the history of paid contributions. The levels of benefits are high and 
earnings-related. The collective schemes are financed through compulsory contributions. 
The private provision plays a marginal role. The level of decommodification is medium, 
but is largely concentrated among employed people with a high contribution period. In 
terms of stratification, this regime tends to preserve the differences based on occupational 
status.  
 
The Social-democratic Regime offers a high level of collective provision for all residents, 
giving the state a key role in welfare provision. Entitlements are based on residency and the 
levels of benefits are high. The collective provision is financed through taxation. The 
universalistic nature of this regime makes private provision unnecessary. The level of de-
commodification is high, depending on the level of benefit. Because of its universalistic 
nature, this regime promotes equality of citizens. 
 
Esping-Andersen tested empirically his theoretical typology on 18 OECD countries in 
1980. In order to evaluate the decommodification level, he selected the three most 
important cash benefits programmes (pensions, sickness, and unemployment) and a set of 
                                                 
2 In Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies, Esping-Andersen defined more rigorously the concept 
of the regime as: “the ways in which welfare production is allocated between state, market, and households” 
(1999:73).   
3 These three regimes were denominated in accordance with the underlying political ideology and followed 
the famous distinction made by Titmuss (1974) as the residual, the achievement-performance and the 
institutional social policy models.  
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indicators illustrative of the “ease with which an average person can opt out of the market” 
(1990:49).4  The total decommodification score showed that the welfare states cluster into 
three distinct groups (Table 1).5  On the basis of his findings, Esping-Andersen concluded 
that “the idea that welfare states cluster into distinct groups becomes more evident” and that 
“based roughly on how nations cluster around the mean, we can distinguish three groups of 
countries” (1990:54; emphasis added). In spite of the several borderline cases, he 
concluded that each group showed the expected countries according to his theory of 
regimes. Hence, the identification of the three clusters with the social-democratic, 
conservative and liberal regimes, respectively.6 
 
Table 1- Rank-order of welfare states  













































Mean                                                 27.2 
(a) The higher the score, the greater the degree of 
 decommodification; regime label added. 
Source: Esping-Andersen (1990:52, Table 2.2) 
                                                 
 
Esping-Andersen’s conclusions give rise to two separate questions, which are not discussed 
in the literature. The first refers to the dividing points selected. If, as an alternative, the 
clusters had been identified in terms of the highest index increases, a different composition 
would have been obtained:  
                                                 
4 The old-age pensions decommodification index was constructed through the assessment of five indicators: 
replacement rate (net of taxes) for minimum pension, standard replacement (net) rate, contribution period, 
individual’s share of pension financing, and the take up rate. The indicators for sickness and unemployment 
benefits followed a similar logic (Esping-Andersen 1990:54).  
5 Methodological issues in Esping-Andersen (1990:49-50 and Appendix). 
6 Esping-Andersen (1990:77) concluded that decommodification and stratification indices led to very similar 
clusters. This conclusion, however, was not totally confirmed by the results (52, Table 2.2; 74, Table 3.3): 
only three countries (Germany, Sweden and the USA) showed the same classification in the both dimensions. 
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• Australia, USA, New Zealand (Liberal regime) 
• Canada, Ireland, UK, Italy, Japan, France, Germany, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands (Conservative regime) 
• Denmark, Norway, Sweden (Social-democratic regime) 
 
The second question arises from the recognition that analysis of the combined score would 
serve to facilitate the identification of the three clusters. Thus, the term of comparison 
would correspond to the results that had previously been obtained for each of the three 
social programmes (Table 2).   
 
Table 2 - The rank-order of welfare states:  decommodification level by  
social programme 













































































































Mean                    10.7 Mean                        9.2 Mean                       7.1 
  Source: Esping-Andersen (1990: 50, Table 2.1); rank-order added. 
 
 
If dividing points were established in the method used by Esping-Andersen, the ranking 
order of the countries would not lead to consistent clusters (Table 3). In fact, only nine 
countries were part of the same regime for all social programmes and only seven of them 
were in correspondence with the combined score (the UK and Austria were the exceptions). 
The best correspondence (13 countries) with the combined score was shown by the pension 
cash benefits. It is worth emphasising the total correspondence between the clustering of 
the sickness programme and the cluster-assignment resulting from dividing points change; 
the other two programmes also showed a large correspondence.  This finding seems to 
indicate a certain weakness with regard to Esping-Andersen’s methodology. 
 
Following Titmuss (1974), Esping-Andersen (1999) also recognised the importance of the 
typologies in comparative research of welfare states, in particular because: “they allow for 
greater analytical parsimony and help us to see the forest rather than myriad trees” (p.73).7 
                                                 
7 According to Titmuss: “the purpose of model-building is not to admire the architecture of the building, but 
to help us to see some order in all disorder and confusion of facts, systems and choices concerning areas of 
our economic and social life” (1974:30). 
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Table 3 – The three clusters by social programme 
























































































Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1990: 50, Table 2.1; 52, Table 2.2); bold added (countries 
 classified in the same regime). 
  
Yet, he pointed out a fundamental issue:  
 
“[The typologies] provide a snapshot of the world at one point in time and do not easily capture 
mutations or the birth of new species. Any typology of welfare regimes therefore remains valid 
only as long as history stands still”. (1999:73) 
 
With his ´three worlds`, Esping-Andersen “created a new open field for discussion about 
which welfare state systems represent welfare state models” (Aspalter, 2002:1). However, 
as we shall attempt to demonstrate, some of the later theoretical and empirical studies were 
based on different analytical and methodological options from those of Esping-Andersen, a 
fact that should not be overlooked in the process of comparing the respective conclusions. 
2.2. Criticisms of the ´three worlds` 
 
The importance of the typology proposed by Esping-Andersen can be judged by the 
intensity of the debate that it aroused, which has continued until the present day. The 
themes of this debate have focused on several areas of criticism (see Cnaan, 1992; Gough, 
2002a; Wildboer Schut et al., 2001). In view of their having served as points of departure 
for new research works, we can highlight the following areas: 8 
                                                 
8 A further criticism, not considered in this paper, was also prominent in the debate, namely, the neglect of 
gender-dimension (Lewis, 1992, 2002; O´Connor, 1993, 1996; Orloff, 1993, 1996; Siaroff, 1994; Sainsbury, 
1994, 1999). Siaroff‘s typology, based on gender inequalities, included a fourth regime that was characterised 
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i)   The range of countries; 
ii)  The analytical focus on cash benefits; 
iii) The concept of welfare regimes. 
 
The first area of criticism refers to the incorrect classification of certain countries, namely, 
Australia and New Zealand, Japan and Italy. The assertion of a fourth or even a fifth 
regime resulted in the presentation of new typologies (Leibfried, 1992; Castles and 
Mitchell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996a; Bonoli, 1997; Korpi and Palme, 1998). 
 
The second area of criticism is concerned with the identification of the three regimes on the 
basis of the exclusive analysis of cash benefits. The omission of domains and types of State 
intervention, in which more significant differences might be expected among the welfare 
states (for example, in the cases of health care and social services), constituted a motive for 
questioning the validity of the typology. As a result, numerous empirical studies were 
conducted with the aim of confirming Esping-Andersen´ s three-fold division. 
 
The third, and most radical, criticism was put forward by Kasza (2002), in which the very 
concept of the welfare regime came under question, and moreover, its value as an 
instrument of comparative analysis. Concentrating his analysis on State intervention, as the 
essential component of the welfare mix, Kasza defended that each type of regime and the 
respective countries in it should abide by two requirements: i) most of the key policies must 
reflect a similar approach to issues of public welfare; and ii) the coherency between these 
policies should be guaranteed by a defined set of principles (p.272).9 So, it is precisely the 
concept of the welfare regime as a package of public policies that conforms to certain 
principles that Kasza rejects, arguing that, with few exceptions, governments implement 
unconnected or even contradictory social policies. In Kasza’s view, there are five reasons 
by which the internal incoherency of every welfare state can be explained:  
 
“(1) each welfare policy tends to change incrementally over many years; (2) different welfare 
policies in the same country typically have different histories; (3) discrete sets of policy actors 
are involved in the various fields of welfare policy; (4) variations in the policymaking process 
affect the substance of policy; and (5) borrowing from foreign models introduces diverse 
practical and normative elements into each country’s welfare”. (p.282) 
 
Kasza proposes that the way to overcome the divergences on the ideal number of regimes is 
to restrict comparative analysis to a specific domain (for example, pensions, 
unemployment, health), and to expand the number of countries analysed. (p. 284). 
The new typologies and empirical studies associated with the three above-outlined 
criticisms will be examined in the later sub-sections of this paper.  
                                                                                                                                                    
by a late mobilisation of women, observable in the Mediterranean and Asian countries. However, for 
Wildboer Schut et al. (2001:17), the interest of this classification was condensed in the study of the gender-
sensitive aspects of the welfare state. Bambra (2004) sought to demonstrate, with a defamilisation index, that 
the critique of Esping-Andersen was not empirically robust: with the exceptions of Canada, Ireland, the UK 
and Japan, the results coincided with the ´three worlds`.  
9 To Kasza (2002:272): “the principles may derive from the political ideology of governmental forces 
[Scandinavian social-democratic countries], or from Catholic or other religious traditions [Southern Europe], 
or from secular cultural values [Japan]”. 
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2.3. The ´three worlds` revisited by Esping-Andersen 
 
In Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies, (1999), prior to embarking on an 
analysis of the criticisms of his ´three worlds´, Esping-Andersen expressed the following 
observation on the existence of conceptual confusion:  
 
“Some speak of welfare states, some of welfare regimes, some simply of social policy, as if the 
meaning were the same. It is not. Social policy can exist without welfare states, but not the 
other way around”. (p.34) 
 
The above-quotation sheds light on the irrelevance of the critiques based on approaches 
which focus on social programmes rather than on Esping-Andersen’s concept of a welfare 
regime (p.73). Nevertheless, two specific criticisms have drawn Esping-Andersen’s 
attention: the insufficient analysis of the role of the family and the existence of three or 
more regimes. In response to the first, Esping-Andersen defends the importance of 
´familialism` or ´de-familiarisation`, i.e., of the extent to which the household’s welfare 
and caring responsibilities are relaxed by state or market provision, in order to attain a 
better understanding of the role of the family in the welfare mix, as well as a more 
complete characterisation of the regimes.  
 
With regard to the second criticism, he identified three issues concerning the robustness of 
any typology: i) “if alternative attributes were considered, the classification might break 
down or, at least, require additional regimes”; ii) “since [they] refer to one time-point, we 
shall miss out on possibly decisive transmutations”; iii) “since they are ideal types, there 
are bound to be ambiguous cases” (p.86). The omission of these questions would justify the 
conclusions of many empirical studies that stressed the erroneous classification of various 
countries, including the UK and Holland. In the former of these two cases, the reforms of 
the British welfare state undertaken during the 1980s and 1990s would be determinant and 
would not have been encompassed in the ´three worlds`. The classification of Holland 
would depend, for its part, on the analytical focus: whether the regime was social-
democratic (cash benefits) or conservative (social services included) (p.88). He concludes: 
 
“[T]he real problem is how to deal with systematic deviants. The issue here is whether a three-
way typology adequately exhausts the variance. If there are cases that follow a wholly different 
underlying logic, we would have to construct yet another, separate ideal-type   - a fourth ‘world 
of welfare capitalism’ ” (1999:88).  
 
Esping-Andersen acknowledged that Australia, Japan and the Southern European countries 
presented characteristics which were not entirely compatible with this ´three worlds`. 
Nonetheless, and for the sake of analytical parsimony, he maintained that the first two 
cases should be viewed as variants (although with a separate logic) and not as specific 
regimes. The case of the Mediterranean countries merits greater attention, given that the 
creation of a specific regime would depend principally on the role of the family in the 
welfare mix. To this end, Esping-Andersen identifies and assesses two dimensions of 
familialism (the public policies aimed at families and the welfare burden assumed by the 
latter), arguing that Spain, Portugal and Italy do not justify being classified under a specific 
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regime status, since these countries display no significant differences when compared with 
the other countries of Continental Europe (1999:93).10 He concluded thus:  
 
“[T]he question of how to identify and classify welfare regimes will remain open because, as 
noted, researchers differ in terms of what attributes they consider vital and how to measure 
them”. (p.94) 
 
Perhaps to prove his affirmation, Esping-Andersen (1999:84-5) presented a new 
classification based on four characteristics: the role (central, marginal or subsidiary) of the 
state, market and family in the welfare mix; the dominant mode and locus of solidarity in 
the welfare state; and the degree of decommodification. The countries were classified 
according to the model of welfare state and to the dominance of the family in the welfare 
mix (Table 4). 11 
 
Table 4 – New classifications by Esping-Andersen (1999) 
Models of Welfare State Dominance of the Family 







































(a) To a degree; (b) Less so;  
Source: Based on Esping-Andersen (1999:85-6). 
 
 
The combined analysis of these two classifications leads to four groups of countries:12  
 
• Residual/ Non-Familialist: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and USA; 
• Universalist/ Familialist: the Netherlands; 
• Universalist/ Non-Familialist: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; 
• Social insurance/ Familialist: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain. 
 
There are three noteworthy observations on this new classification: the particularity of the 
Netherlands; the correspondence between the first cluster and the liberal regime; and the 
existence of a Scandinavian group. 
2.4. ‘New’ typologies: how many regimes? 
 
The debate since the publication of the ´three worlds` has involved two essential questions: 
what is the number of ideal types of welfare state? Is it three, four or more? Furthermore, 
which countries should be incorporated into which type? Throughout the 1990s, various 
                                                 
10 See results in Esping-Andersen (1999:93, Table 5.5) 
11 The new set of countries included Portugal and Spain, but excluded Ireland and Switzerland.  
12 Portugal and the UK were excluded, for different reasons. 
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typologies were presented (viz. Arts and Gelissen (2002)), but, as Abrahamson (2002:33) 
argues, none of them produced any clarification, given that in certain cases, the authors 
merely attributed new names to regimes that had already been identified. Both issues regard 
the classification of the following countries as specific regimes or as sub-regimes: the 
South-east Asian countries, Australasia, the Southern and Eastern European countries.13  
 
The theoretical and empirical interest in classifying the countries of Southern Europe 
involved, between 1992 and the present time, a large number of researchers, due to their 
discontent with the classification of Esping-Andersen (1990). 
 
One of those in agreement with Esping-Andersen was Katrougalos (1996:43), who asserted 
that those countries constituted a sub-category or variant of the conservative regime, in 
view of their relatively under-developed welfare states which displayed in common the 
immaturity of the social protection systems and some similar social and family structures.14  
 
In contrast, the typologies of Ferrera (1996a) and Bonoli (1997) – Table 5 – included a 
fourth regime to encompass the Mediterranean countries.15  
 
The innovative contribution of Ferrera (1996a,b) was based on two facts: the lack of 
interest manifested up to that time in analysing the Mediterranean countries as a group, or, 
in the scarce studies that included them at all, in classifying them as a sub-group of the 
conservative regime, characterised by a lower level of development. Clarifying that his 
main purpose was “to compile a preliminary, descriptive checklist of features rather than 
outline a coherent and rigorous ‘type’”, Ferrera decided “to sketch out a closer profile of 
Southern European policy and politics” (1996a:18). Confining his study to the Western 
European countries, he selected, first, the following indicators: i) eligibility rules; ii) 
structure of benefits; iii) financing; and iv) organisational-managerial arrangements. 
It is apparently on the basis of the aforementioned indicators that Ferrera proposed the 
grouping of the systems into four institutional configurations or distinct ´families`. Of 
these, three displayed profiles that differed very little from the regimes of Esping-Andersen 
(1990), almost certainly due to the fact that they were based on similar indicators. 
However, Ferrera’s clusters did not coincide with that of Esping-Anderson, namely, Anglo-
Saxon (Ireland, UK); Bismarckian (Germany, Austria, Belgium, France, Holland, 
Luxemburg and Switzerland); Scandinavian (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland). The 
fourth “family” (Southern Europe) comprised the Mediterranean countries, the social 
                                                 
13 The debate with reference to the Asian and Australasian countries is not considered in the present analysis. 
For the Asian countries, see, for example, Jones (1990, 1993), Kwon (1997) and Gough (2000b). The 
inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the liberal regime was contested by Castles and Mitchell (1992, 
1993), who instead supported a fourth regime (designated Radical, and which would include the UK), the 
concept of which was rejected by Esping-Andersen (1999:89-90). 
14 This fourth regime is also supported by Gough (1996) and Adão and Silva (2000).  
15 In addition, Leibfried (1992) identified four models differentiated by the level of development of social 
citizenship, as well as the effectiveness of the system in combating poverty. The fourth model (Rudimentary), 
applicable to Spain, Greece, Portugal, France and Italy, could be characterised as a “welfare state as half-
institutionalised promise”, owing to the absence of social minimums (p.23). The notion of a specific ´regime` 
based on an insufficiency of social assistance led Esping-Andersen (1999) to affirm that “Leibfried misses the 
mark because he is studying a qualitatively different phenomenon” (p.74). 
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protection systems of which presented, with highly heterogeneous degrees of maturation, 
their own specific profiles, described by Ferrera in the following two points:   
 
 “(i) the peculiar ´excesses` in income maintenance: peaks of generosity accompanied by vast 
gaps in protection, and (ii) the departure from institutional corporatism in the field of health 
care and the (partial) establishment of national health services, based on universalistic 
principles”. (1996a:29) 
 
The fact that the two systems – health and social security – are governed by different 
principles might effectively represent an important element of differentiation16. However, 
the polarisation of material cover can only be explained by the lower level of development 
of the systems, as acknowledged by the EC (1993), Ferrera et al. (2000) and Vogel 2003). 
 
However, Ferrera identified two additional characteristics:  
 
 “(iii) the low degree of state penetration of the welfare sphere, in a broad sense, and the 
peculiar mix between public and non-public actors and institutions; and (iv) the persistence and 
formation – in some cases – of fairly elaborate ´patronage systems` for the selective distribution 
of cash benefits” (Ferrera, 1996a:29)17.  
 
It seems that these characteristics have been decisive in the characterisation of the southern 
European systems. In effect, Ferrera wrote: 
 
 “The Southern European welfare state is characterised by a peculiar mode of political 
functioning which distinguishes it not only from the highly homogeneous, standardized and 
universalistic welfare states of Northern Europe, but also from the more fragmented continental 
systems” (1996a:29).  
 
This conclusion gives rise to two questions, each of a different nature. Firstly, the 
comparison seems to be based on different dimensions: the political functioning of the 
Latin countries and the principles of organisation for the other countries. Secondly, and 
without commenting on the major susceptibility of the State to influence from interest 
groups (particularly in the case of health), Ferrera´s reflection on political clientelism 
appears to be a forced generalisation on the domain of social security, at least with regard 
to Portugal. As Ferrera himself states:  
 
“The electoral manipulation of welfare benefits is a well-known phenomenon in all democratic 
countries [...], however, the relationship between welfare and voting is commonly understood 
in general and impersonal terms and not as an immediate/personal one, i.e. as a ´real` exchange 
of individual votes for individual benefits.” (1996a:25)  
 
 
                                                 
16 The coexistence of both principles suggests that Kasza (2002) was correct. 
17 According to Ferrera, the first characteristic explains a deficit of ´stateness`, i.e.: “broadly, the degree of 
decision-making autonomy of state officials vis-à-vis non-state actors as well as their capacity to implement 
decisions” (1996a:25, 35). 
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Table 5 - Types of welfare state and their characteristics 
 
Esping-Andersen (1990) 
1.  Liberal 
Low level of decommodification; market-differentiation of welfare 
2.  Conservative 
      Moderate level of decommodification; social benefits mainly dependent on former contributions and status 
3.  Social-democratic 
High level of decommodification; universal benefits and high degree of benefit equality 
 
Ferrera (1996) 
1.  Anglo-Saxon 
     Fairly high welfare state coverage; social assistance with a means test; mixed system of financing; highly   
integrated organisational framework entirely managed by a public administration 
2.  Bismarckian 
Strong link between work position and social entitlements; benefits proportional to income; financing through 
contributions; reasonably substantial social assistance benefits; insurance schemes mainly governed by unions 
and employer organisations 
3.  Scandinavian 
     Social protection as a citizenship right; universal coverage; relatively generous fixed benefits for various   risks; 
financing mainly through fiscal revenues; strong organisational integration 
4.  Southern 
Fragmented system of income guarantees linked to work position; generous benefits without articulated net  
minimum social protection; health care as a right of citizenship; particularism in payments of cash benefits and 
financing; financing through contributions and fiscal revenues 
 
Bonoli (1997) 
1.  British 
Low % of social expenditure financed through contributions (Beveridge); low social expenditure as a % of GDP 
2. Continental 
High % of social expenditure financed through contributions (Bismarck); high social expenditure as a % of GDP 
3.  Nordic 
  Low % of social expenditure financed through contributions (Beveridge); high social expenditure as a % of GDP 
4.  Southern 
 High % of social expenditure financed through contributions (Bismarck);  low social expenditure as a % of GDP 
 
Korpi and Palme (1998) 
1.  Basic Security 
 Entitlements based on citizenship or contributions; application of the flat-rate benefit principle 
2.  Corporatist 
 Entitlements based on occupational category and labour force participation; use of earnings-related benefit 
principle 
3.  Encompassing 
 Entitlements based on citizenship and labour force participation; flat-rate and earnings-related benefit principle 
4.  Targeted  
 Eligibility based on proven need; use of the minimum benefit principle 
5.  Voluntary State Subsidised  
 Eligibility based on membership or contributions; flat-rate or earnings-related benefit principle 
 
Source: Arts and Gelissen (2002:144-5, Table 1); the typologies of Leibfried (1992), Castles and Mitchell (1993) and 
Siaroff (1994) are excluded. 
 
 
Thus, Ferrera declares that in the Latin countries, both forms of “exchange” (impersonal 
and personal) have equal importance and that social transfers have been used to 
complement low salaries, in exchange for party political support and with the frequent 
intermediation of the trade unions themselves. We can reach agreement on a ‘manipulation 
of the welfare system’, for example by means of extraordinary pension increases during 
pre-electoral periods, or the facilitating of early retirement for determined occupational 
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groups. However, only with great difficulty can the logic of personal exchange be applied 
in a generalised sense to social benefits. On this subject, it is valid to recall the comment of 
Esping-Andersen:  
 
“Ferrera´s point has mainly to do with distributive practice – the pervasive use of social 
benefits [...] for purposes of political clientelism. […]A perverted use of welfare programmes 
and public bureaucracies may define the character of a policy, but it is difficult to see how it 
defines a welfare regime unless the entire system was from the very beginning specifically 
designed for the purpose of clientelism rather than social protection. Such an argument would 
be very hard to sustain” (1999:90).  
 
Sotiropoulos (2004) also acknowledged the distinction between the bureaucracies of the 
Mediterranean countries and those of the other Western European countries, given that:  
“until recently they were still characterised by a number of distinguishing interrelated 
characteristics” (p.419). In relation to the common tendency to associate Southern 
European bureaucracy with corruption and insufficiency, the author contended that:  “these 
are behavioral patterns rather than structural characteristics” (p.406). 
 
Another typology was presented by Bonoli (1997), for whom the existing classifications 
were found to be excessively limited by their uni-dimensional approach, expressed in the 
analysis of the “quantity” of provision (´how much` dimension’), or of the different 
provision models (´how` dimension) (p.352). His critique was directed at the typologies of 
Esping-Andersen and Ferrera. In spite of his accepting that the decommodification dimension 
incorporated quantity and quality indicators (for example, values of benefits and conditions 
of access), Bonoli arrived at the conclusion that “Esping-Andersen still ends up with a 
classification based on the quantity of welfare provided by individual welfare states” 
(p.354). On the contrary, the weakness of Ferrera’s classification resides in the fact that the 
qualitative dimension is not taken into consideration. Bonoli’s response was to develop a 
bi-dimensional classification, based on the Bismarckian and Beveridgean models (Table 6). 
 
Table 6 - The Bismarckian and the Beveridgean models  











Prevention of poverty 
Flat rate 
Residence or need 
Entire population 
Taxation  
Source: Bonoli (1997:357) 
 
In order to analyse empirically his typology, Bonoli selected two indicators: i) social 
expenditure as a proportion of the GDP and ii) the percentage of social expenditure 
financed through contributions (p.360). Next, he set the reference values for each indicator 
at 25% and 50%, respectively. As a result, the countries were grouped in one of four types 
of social protection system: British, Nordic, Continental and Southern (Figure 1). 18 
 
 
                                                 
18 For an analysis of the relative situation of the various countries, see Bonoli (1997:361). 
 15
Figure 1- European Welfare States according to two dimensions 
 SE financed through  
Contributions  <  50% 
SE financed through  


































                                 Source: Based on Bonoli (1997: 361, Figure 1) 
 
Bonoli concluded that the first three groups validated Esping-Andersen’s typology, while 
the last group corresponded to the fourth regime proposed by Leibfried (1992). This 
amounts to a generous evaluation, in view of the number of exceptions observed. 
Compared with the reference values, Luxemburg, Portugal and Switzerland appear as 
mixed cases; whilst substantially differentiated by their respective social efforts, they 
presented a common equal emphasis on Bismarckian and Beveridgean social policy, 
evaluated by the model of financing. On the basis of these findings, Bonoli concludes that 
“it seems appropriate not to consider the four [groups] as sealed clusters of totally different 
welfare states” (p.362). 
 
The more recent typology, based on the institutional characteristics of the social security 
systems, was developed by Korpi and Palme (1998).  The evaluation of the pensions and 
sickness cash benefits was based on three dimensions:  
 
i) The bases of entitlement (eligibility based on need, contributions, belonging to a 
specified occupational category or on citizenship/residence);  
ii) The principle applied to determine benefit levels (minimum benefit, flat rate benefits 
or benefits related to previous earnings); 
iii) The forms of governance (whether or not representatives of employers and employees 
participate in the governing of a social programme) (p.666-7). 
 
Based on these dimensions, they identified five ideal types of institutional structures: 
Targeted, Voluntary State-Subsidised, Corporatist, Basic Security and Encompassing 
(Table 7).  
This typology was tested empirically for the same 18 countries as Esping-Andersen (1990), 
but with data for the year 1985. From the results obtained by Korpi and Palme, it was 
possible to draw the following conclusions (p.669-70): 
 
• The Targeted model was found only in Australia;19  
• The Voluntary State-Subsidised model did not characterise any country;  
                                                 
19 However, Korpi and Palme (1998:670) identified targeted programmes for poor people in all countries. 
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• The Corporatist model was found in six countries (Japan and five countries of 
continental Europe - Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy); 
• The Basic Security model was found in a heterogeneous group of eight countries 
(UK, Ireland, Denmark, Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, USA and New 
Zealand); 



































Occupational category and 
labor force participation 
 
Citizenship or Contributions 
 


























       Source: Korpi and Palme (1998:666) 
 
From a theoretical point of view, it is an interesting typology. However, the empirical test 
has a weakness: the 1985 data neglects all reforms of systems that took place during the 
1990s. With respect to empirical analysis, Korpi and Palme made an important remark: 
 
“(...) the ideal models refer to single social insurance programmes in a particular insurance area. 
However, more than one programme, and thus more than one institutional type, may exist in a 
given insurance area. (...) Thus, the clustering of countries must sometimes be based on 
tendencies and gradations rather than on clear-cut criteria close to ideal types”. (p.669) 
 
2.5. What do we learn from the comparison of the typologies? 
 
Let us now move on to a comparison of the typologies from the perspective of the number 
and composition of the respective clusters. It should, however, be taken into account that 
the typologies analysed are based on different conceptual and methodological options. This 
justifies the a priori comparison of the analytical focus, indicators, countries selected and 




Table 8 – Four typologies of the welfare state: the methodological options 




Old-age Pensions (b): replacement rate net of taxes 
(minimum pension); standard replacement (net) 
rate; contribution period; individual’s share of 
pension financing; the take-up rate. 
  







Rules of access; benefit principle; financing 
regulations; organisational- managerial 
arrangements. 
 
Social Protection:   





Social expenditure as % of GDP; the % of social 
expenditure financed through contributions. 








Bases of entitlement; benefit principle; governance 
of social insurance programmes. 





(a) Decommodification only 
(b) The variables for sickness and unemployment benefits follow a similar logic (Esping-Andersen, 1990:54) 
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
 
With reference to the object of analysis, two types of options are observed: the selection of 
specific programmes within the social security systems, as is the case of Esping-Andersen 
and Korpi and Palme; or an approach considering the social protection systems, with 
varying degrees of simplification, as preferred by Ferrera and by Bonoli. Regarding the 
choice of indicators, institutional characteristics dominate; only Bonoli opts for aggregated 
quantitative indicators. Concerning the countries selected, a clear divergence is observed 
between, on one hand, Esping-Andersen and Korpi and Palme (the same 18 OECD 
countries) and on the other hand, Ferrera and Bonoli (European countries only). Lastly, the 
time horizon of observations is restricted to the 1980s and early 1990s, so that even the 
most recent typologies do not incorporate the reforms introduced into the systems, 
particularly in social security, during the 1990s.  
 
For our comparison of the typologies, we have used the correspondence of the regimes 
presented by Arts and Gelissen (2002). An initial analysis comprises the twelve countries 
which were selected in common by all of the authors. It is verified that only six countries 
(in bold in Table 9 below) are given the same classification: 
 
• Type I:  Ireland and the UK;  
Type II:  France and  Germany; • 
• Type III:  Norway and Sweden. 
 
When a wider analytical criterion is adopted, i.e., the totals of all twenty-two countries, we 
then observe that fourteen countries have the same classification (eight countries 
underlined, together with the six in bold in Table 9 below): 
  
• Type I:  Ireland, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and the USA; 
• Type II: France, Germany, Luxembourg and Japan; 
• Type III: Norway and Sweden;  
• Type IV: Greece, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 9 - Classification of countries according to four typologies 
Type/Model 
 
           
Author(s) 
     I                             II                          III                           IV                        V 
Esping-Andersen  (a) Liberal                Conservative      Social-democratic     
Australia             Finland               Austria 
Canada                France               Belgium 
Ireland               Germany           Denmark 
New Zealand       Italy                   Netherlands 
UK                       Japan                 Norway 
USA                     Switzerland       Sweden                         
                
Ferrera   Anglo-Saxon       Bismarckian      Scandinavian           Southern 
Ireland               Austria               Denmark                 Greece 
UK                      Belgium             Finland                    Italy 
                            France               Norway                   Portugal 
                            Germany          Sweden                    Spain 
                            Luxembourg  
                            Netherlands 
                            Switzerland 
 
Bonoli  British                 Continental        Nordic                    Southern 
Ireland               Belgium             Denmark                 Greece 
UK                      France               Finland                   Italy 
                           Germany           Norway                  Portugal 
                            Luxembourg      Sweden                  Spain 
                            Netherlands                                       Switzerland                            
 
Korpi and Palme  
 
Basic Security     Corporatist       Encompassing                                       Targeted 
Canada                 Austria             Finland                                                  Australia 
Denmark              Belgium           Norway 
Ireland                France             Sweden 
Netherlands         Germany 
New Zealand        Italy 




(a) Decommodification only. 
Source: Arts and Gelissen (2002: 149-150; emphasis added)  
 
Of the countries for which a divergent classification is observed, the most prominent are the 
hybrid cases of Holland and Switzerland, which ‘belong’ simultaneously to three types. 20  
Moreover, for the countries with common classifications, partial comparison of typologies 
produces another analytical perspective. The Ferrera/Bonoli comparison results in an 
identical classification, as expected, with the sole exception of Switzerland. The 
comparison of Ferrera and Esping-Andersen produces a significant similitude, since, on 
eliminating Holland, eight of the remaining twelve countries present the same 
classification. Less expressive results emerge from the comparison of Korpi and Palme 
with Esping-Andersen: only eleven countries have the same classification. 
 
The divergences in the classifications of the European countries justify the following 
remarks: i) the case of Italy can be taken to represent the crucial question as to whether a 
                                                 
20 The inclusion of Switzerland in the Southern Europe model can be explained by possible incompatibilities 
in the data used (Bonoli, 1997:370). 
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specific regime for the Latin countries exists or not; ii) in the cases of Denmark, Austria, 
Belgium and Finland, the classifications of Esping-Andersen, Ferrera and Bonoli are 
clearly dominant. 
 
One of the aims of the next part of this paper is to discover to what extent the various 
empirical studies carried out have contributed to the clarification of the above-mentioned 
divergences. 
3. Empirical Studies 
3.1. Confirmations and Contradictions 
 
The attempts to identify the ideal typology have been accompanied by an even more 
abundant production of empirical studies. A highly significant number of studies sought to 
test the three regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990), based either on the same or different 
groups of countries and using the same or different methodologies. Other studies attempted 
to confirm the existence of a larger number of regimes, using different country-groups and 
methodologies to those of Esping-Andersen. The majority of the studies present different 
approaches to the concept of the welfare state.21 
 
Thirteen empirical studies carried out between 1994 and 2005 are presented below in 
chronological order. The selection is based on two criteria: the attempt to develop a 
constructive response to the three critiques of the “three worlds”; the diversity of 
conceptual and methodological options. This diversity, which is displayed in summarised 
form in Table 10, requires great prudence when comparing the results obtained, due in 
particular to the use of data relating to a time-span of more than twenty years, during which 
period the European systems of social protection underwent many changes.  
 
Table 10 – Empirical studies: countries, data and methods 
Author (s) Countries  Data Method  
Ragin (1994) 18 OECD 1985 Cluster analysis 
Kangas (1994) 18 OECD 1985 Cluster analysis 
Obinger e Wagschal (1998) 18 OECD 1980 Esping-Andersen (EA)´s method 
Wildboer Schut et al. (2001) 11 OECD Early-1990s Principal component analysis  
Kautto (2002) 15 (European) 1990 & 1997 Cluster analysis 
Saint-Arnaud & Bernard (2003) 20 OECD (a) 1993/98 Cluster analysis 
MacMenamim (2003) 22 (a) 2001/02  Cluster analysis 
Soede et al (2004) 23 (a)  1998-2001  Principal component analysis 
Powell & Barrientos (2004) 21 (a) 1990/96 Cluster analysis 
Gal (2004) 10  1998/99 Method of EA 
Bambra (2005b) 18 OECD 1998 Method of EA 
Bambra (2005b) 18 OECD 1997/99 Method of EA 
Ferreira & Figueiredo (2005) EU-15 and  EU-25 2001/03 Cluster analysis 
(a) These studies examine the four Mediterranean countries; the last two also included some Eastern  
European countries.  
Source: Elaborated by the author. 
 
                                                 
21 With regard to the definition of the welfare state, see, for example Barr (1992). 
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The criticism of Esping-Andersen’s methodology (e.g. Ragin, 1994; Kangas, 1994; Shalev, 
1996; Pitruzzello, 1999; and Pierson, 2000) gave rise to the first two studies, which tested 
the ´three worlds`, but using another statistical methodology. 22   
 
Using a cluster analysis and data for 1985, Ragin (1994) examined the pension cash 
benefits in the 18 OECD countries.23 He concluded that the ´three worlds` failed the test, 
given that only nine countries confirmed Esping-Andersen’s classification:  
 
• Liberal: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, USA; 
• Conservative: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy;  
• Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, Sweden; 
• Undefined: Germany, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, and UK. 
 
The findings would be the same if the pension decommodification index – instead of the 
combined index – had been used. It is of interest to note the improved correspondence with 
Esping-Andersen’s (1999) classification.   
 
Kangas (1994) applied a cluster analysis to sickness cash benefits in 15 OECD countries 
(data from 1985). He identified four clusters, due to the liberal regime sub-division: 24 
 
• Liberal: Canada, USA; 
• Radical: Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, United Kingdom; 
• Conservative: Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands; 
• Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden. 
 
Once again, the results did not confirm Esping-Andersen’s typology. However, the 
comparison with the sickness insurance decommodification index would be more 
supportive (ten countries in the same clusters). 
 
Obinger and Wagschal (1998) applied a cluster analysis to the original data on social 
stratification and the same countries used by Esping-Andersen.  They found support for 
four regimes:  
 
• Liberal: Canada, Japan, Switzerland, USA; 
• Radical: Australia, New Zealand; 
• Conservative: Austria, France, Italy; 
• Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, Sweden; 
• Hybrid European: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, UK. 
 
We can observe that the radical and hybrid clusters do not entirely confirm the results of the 
first two studies. 
 
                                                 
22 The methodology of Esping-Andersen (1990) consisted of a two-stage process of qualitative grouping, 
followed by multiple regressions.  
23 The cluster analysis is applied in half of the selected studies. According to Gough (2001), this statistical 
methodology is “robust, meaningful and simple” (p.169). 
24 With the exception of Ireland, the Radical group coincides with Castles and Mitchell (1993). 
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In the study of Wildeboer Schut et al. (2001), 11 OECD countries were examined. They 
applied a non-linear principal component analysis to 58 indicators related to the social 
security systems and the labour market.25 Data covering the early 1990s was used, which 
constitutes a limitation that is recognised by the authors. The results validated the typology 
of Esping-Andersen (1990), with the exception of Holland.  
  
• Liberal: Australia, Canada, UK, and USA;  
• Conservative: Belgium, France, and Germany;  
• Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden; 
• Hybrid case: the Netherlands 
 
In an innovative way, Wildboer Schut et al. also examined each cluster concluding that: 
“not all the countries share the same characteristics of their cluster to an equal degree” 
(p.25). Some of the most noteworthy aspects are reported below: 
 
Liberal group 
The USA is the most residual (...) and moreover, the characteristics often fall into the 
most extreme category; Australia is less residual than the USA; Canada is less uniformly 
liberal than the USA and Australia; the UK is moderately residual (...) with a certain 
distortion in the direction of the social-democratic group. (p. 25-28) 
 
Conservative group 
Belgium and France display the corporatist characteristics with few exceptions (e.g. 
social assistance); Germany has a clearly corporatist system, with a number of aspects 
related to the liberal (e.g. child benefit) and the social-democratic groups (e.g. disability 
benefit insurance). (p.28-30) 
 
Social-democratic group  
Sweden displays all characteristics without distortion; Denmark shows a slight distortion 
in the direction of the liberal group (e.g. many flat-rate benefits); Norway is, in certain 
respects, less social-democratic (e.g. very low coverage of voluntary insurance). (p.30/1) 
 
In the above classification, the USA, Germany and Sweden are identified as the respective 
prototype for each group. Certain academics have contended (for example, Alber, 1995; 
Anttonen and Sipilä, 1996; Gough, 1996; Daly and Lewis, 2000; Room, 2000), in their 
critiques of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) proposition, that the ´three worlds` would not be 
validated if the approach to the welfare state were to encompass other public social 
policies, such as education, health and social services.   
 
Kautto (2002) tested this hypothesis, applying a hierarchical cluster analysis to benefits in 
cash and benefits in kind (education excluded) in the EU-15. Based on data for the years 
1990 and 1997, two indicators were constructed: i) service effort (expenditure on benefits 
in kind in % of GDP); and ii) transfer effort (expenditure on cash benefits in % of GDP). 
The number of clusters depends on the analytical focus. The findings based on service 
                                                 
25 List of indicators in Wildboer and Schut (2001:35-39). 
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effort (SE) did not confirm the ´three worlds`, since only “two clusters robust enough” were 
identified (p.62): 26 
 
• A high SE group: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, France, Germany and UK;  
• A low SE group: Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Spain, and Portugal.  
 
However, the analyses of the service and transfer efforts (TE) showed the existence of three 
distinct groups (p.62): 
 
• A ´service approach` group: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Germany and the 
UK (high SE, and average or high TE);  
• A ´transfer approach` group: Belgium, the Netherlands, Austria and Italy (high TE, average 
or low SE); 
• A third group: Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain (low SE and low TE). 
 
The correspondence with Esping-Andersen was limited to the number of clusters giving a 
completely different cluster assignment.  
 
Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003) tested the typologies of Esping-Andersen/Ferrera/Bonoli. 
They applied a hierarchical cluster analysis to 36 indicators of public policy, social 
situation and civic participation. 27 The data used relates to the period 1993-98. The results 
revealed the existence of four clusters: 
 
• The Liberal countries (Australia, Canada, Ireland, Island, New Zealand, UK and USA);  
• The Conservative countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands);  
• The Social-democratic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden);  
• The Familist countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). 
 
In general terms, the clusters identified verify the typologies tested. In support of Esping-
Andersen (1999:90), various characteristics common to the systems of the first and fourth 
groups were observed. From an innovative perspective, Saint Arnaud and Bernard proposed 
to evaluate the stability of the regimes over time, by replicating their analysis through the 
period 1986–1990. The results revealed an interesting alteration, namely, that Italy and 
Spain moved into the conservative regime (p.84).  
 
The hypothesis that the Eastern-Central European countries (represented by the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland from a total of 22 countries) constitute a specific regime 
was tested by MacMenamim (2003).28 A cluster analysis was applied to 55 indicators 
relating to three areas: political institutions, social welfare and economic structures.29 The 
date used was related to 2001/02. The results in respect of the most appropriate number of 
clusters were inconclusive. With regard to the three countries, it was possible to reach the 
                                                 
26 According to Bambra (2005b:60), Germany and the UK joined the first group during the 1990s, which can 
be partly explained by the aging of their populations. 
27 Indicators listed in Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003:82-83).  
28 According to Deacon (1993:195-7), the classification of the Eastern European systems as a specific regime 
or as a variant depends on the countries studied.  
29 List of indicators in MacMenamim (2003:17). 
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following conclusions: they always appear in the same cluster, regardless of its number; 
they form a specific cluster in the solutions to six or more clusters; they are found together 
with Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain in the solutions to three or four clusters; and they 
never appear in the cluster incorporating Australia, Canada, Switzerland, the USA and the 
UK (p.12-3). While they display a strong homogeneity among themselves, the countries of 
Eastern-Central Europe only justify classification as a specific regime in the hypothesis of a 
high number of regimes, which has been rejected by Esping-Andersen.   
 
Soede et al. (2004) sought to confirm the existence of specific regimes for the Southern and 
Eastern European countries. The 23 countries selected were theoretically classified into six 
groups (Table 11).   
 
Table 11 - Theoretical classification of countries 
Social-democratic      Conservative       Liberal        Hybrid            Mediterranean     Eastern European(a) 
Denmark                  Austria               Australia      Netherlands     Greece                 Czech Republic 
Finland                     Belgium             Canada                                 Italy                     Hungary  
Norway                    France                Ireland                                  Portugal               Poland 
Sweden                     Germany           UK                                       Spain                    Slovakia 
                                 Luxembourg       USA 
(a) The shortage of available data explains the exclusion of six new Member States of UEM. 
Source: Soede et al. (2004:29) 
 
They applied a principal components analysis to 85 characteristics of the social security 
systems and labour market and collected data from 1998 to 2001.30 Five regimes were 
identified: 
 
• Liberal (the USA being the most residual system, followed by Australia)31 
• Conservative  
• Nordic (Norway excluded)  
• Mediterranean (Greece and Spain as the most distinct examples of this model)  
• Eastern European  
 
These findings were in close correspondence with Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003) – the 
first to the fourth groups – and de MacMenamim (2003) – homogeneity of the eastern 
European systems. The Netherlands and Norway were classified as hybrid cases. 
 
Powell and Barrientos (2004) also tested the three-fold division of Esping-Andersen 
collecting data from 1990 to 96 in 21 countries. They applied a hierarchical and k-means 
cluster analysis to three variables characterising the welfare mix and the active labour 
market policies (p.92): i) public spending on social security, education and active labour 
policies as a proportion of GDP; ii) private insurance premia as a proportion of GDP as a 
measure of household expenditure on private insurance; and iii) an index of the strictness of 
employment protection.32 
                                                 
30 Indicators listed in Soede et al. (2004: 135-144, Appendix A1). 
31 This cluster is in correspondence with Wildboer Schut et al. (2001); the classification of Australia did not 
confirm the existence of a ´radical` regime claimed by, for example, Korpi and Palme (1998). 
32 This index incorporates information on procedural constraints on termination, required period of notice and 
severance pay, and difficulty of dismissal (p. 92). 
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Table 12 shows the cluster assignment based on the three variables. Powell and Barrientos 
concluded that these findings largely confirmed the clustering of Esping-Andersen (p.96). 
However, only 13 countries showed the same classification. Regarding this aspect, Powell 
and Barrientos recognised some “‘rogue’ classifications”, but argued that “the cluster 
analysis is a heuristic device that is sensitive to the selection of routines” (p.97).It is 
remarked that the clustering of Powell and Barrientos showed the closest correspondence 
with the typology of Korpi and Palme (1998).  
 
Table 12 - Clusters of countries (data 1990-96) 























Source: Powell and Barrientos (2004: 97, Table 2). 
 
Gal (2004) examined the role of work injury programmes in 10 countries that represent 
various types of welfare regimes, by taking into account two dimensions: 
decommodification and self-development.33 This new concept seeks to measure the degree 
to which the welfare states provide individuals with skills and intellectual tools to engage in 
paid work (p.57).34 Two countries were selected from each of the four regime types of 
Esping-Andersen, Australia was included as a typical Australasian welfare state and Israel 
as a hybrid case (p.61). Gal constructed two indices using the same statistical methology of 
Esping-Andersen and data from 1998/9.35 The rank-order of the countries based on the 
decommodification index roughly fitted the ‘three worlds’: 36 
 
• High score: Australia, Sweden; 
• Middle score: France, Denmark, Germany, Spain and Israel; 
• Low score: Greece, USA, and the UK. 
 
In particular, the scores received by Australia, Denmark, Spain and Israel were not as 
expected (p.63). Second, a ranking order was based on a joint-decommodification/self-
development index: 37 
 
• High score Group: Denmark and Sweden;  
• Middle-to-high score Group: Australia, Germany, France and Israel; 
• Low score Group: Spain and the UK. 
                                                 
33  Under the following definition: “work-injury programmes are programmes that provide cash and in-kind 
benefits as compensation for temporary or permanent incapacity due to work-originating injury or illness, and 
those that offer market-oriented rehabilitation to the victims of work-injury (p.61). 
34 The second dimension was based on the “decommodification-for-self-development dimension”, suggested 
by Room (2000:337). 
35 The indicators, statistical method and results can be seen in Gal (2004: 61-4). 
36 Rank-order of countries by decreasing score. 
37 The USA and Greece were excluded, due to the shortage of available data (p.65).  
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These results provided two surprises among the countries: Australia and Israel, given the 
accepted wisdom regarding their systems (p.66). 
 
The study of Bambra (2005a) drew upon Kasza’s critique to “highlight the health care 
discrepancy” (p.31). She constructed a health care decommodification index based on 1998 
data and using the same countries and methodology as Esping-Andersen.38  
Three measures asserting the financing, provision and coverage of the private sector were 
selected:  “ i) Private health expenditure as a percentage of GDP; ii) Private hospital beds as 
a percentage of total bed stock; and iii) The percentage of the population covered by the 
health care system” (p.34). Table 13 shows the results. 
 
Table 13 - Health care decommodification typology 

































   Source: Bambra (2005a: 36, Table2); italics added. 
 
As Bambra asserted, these results simultaneously allow both the validation and the 
contestation of Esping-Andersen’s classification: on one hand, ten countries (identified in 
italics in the above table), appear in the same regime-type; on the other hand, the 
classification of the other countries differs from that of the “three worlds”, most widely in 
the cases of Canada, Ireland and New Zealand. Consequently, three conclusions are 
possible (Bambra, 2005a:37): i) the necessary existence of a fourth regime, to be called 
radical, which would consist of Canada, New Zealand and the UK; ii) the confirmation of a 
Scandinavian regime, characterised by high decommodification in different areas of 
welfare provision; iii) the verification of Kasza’s (2002) critique, since the positioning of 
the three countries referred to varies according to the public social policy considered.  
 
In another study, Bambra (2005b) explored the critique of Esping-Andersen’s analytical 
focus arguing that “[it] ignores the fact that welfare states are also about the delivery of 
services (...) and that, far from being internally consistent, countries vary in terms of the 
relative emphasis that they place upon cash benefits and/or welfare states services”(p.196). 
Bambra tested the robustness of the ´three worlds`, comparing the decommodification 
levels of the main cash benefits (pensions, sickness and unemployment) with the main area 
of welfare state service delivery: health care.39 She used the 18 OECD countries and data 
                                                 
38 Health care decommodification refers to the extent to which an individual’s access to health care is 
dependent upon their market position and the extent to which a country’s provision of health is independent of 
the market (Bambra 2005a:33). 
39 When extended to cover health care services, decommodification refers to the extent an individual’s access 
to health care is dependent upon their market position and the extent to which a country’s provision of health 
is independent from the market (Bambra, 2005b). 
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for 1997-9. The cash benefits and the health care services decommodification indexes were 
based on the indicators used by Esping-Andersen (1990) and Bambra (2005a), respectively. 
The results showed that the inclusion of health care to the comparative analysis leads to 
five clusters (p.208-9): 
 
• Social-democratic: Finland, Norway and Sweden (high scores in both indices); 
• Conservative sub-group: Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland (scores more highly on 
cash benefits index); 
• Liberal sub-group: Ireland, New Zealand and the UK (scores more highly on health service 
index); 40 
• Liberal: Australia, Japan and the USA (low scores for both index);  
• Conservative: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France and Italy (very close to the 
average score for both indices).  
 
According to Bambra, the most rigorous classification of the two new clusters, either as 
specific regimes or simply as variants, would require more extensive analysis including 
other programmes, for example, education or social services (p.210-1). 
 
Finally, Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005) attempted to establish the differences among 
existing regimes in the European Union, prior to and following its enlargement in 2004, 
based on a very wide conceptual approach: welfare mix, stratification effects and welfare 
outcomes. A hierarchical cluster analysis was applied to 36 indicators representing five 
different welfare domains, using data related to 2001-3.41 The results diverge according to 
the group of countries analysed42. Hence, when the analysis is restricted to the EU-15, only 
two clusters are identified.  
                                                
 
• Mediterranean cluster: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; 
• Non-Mediterranean cluster: the rest of the EU-15. 
 
This finding, which is curious in that it presents no differentiation among eleven countries, 
is considered to be sufficiently robust, since: “it prevails for different procedures and for 
partial analysis for most of the domains” (p.24-5). However, when the analysis embraces 
the EU-25, three clusters are identified: 
 
• 1st cluster: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain; 
• 2nd cluster: Irlanda, Estónia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia;  
• 3rd cluster: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, the UK and also the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia. 
 
In addition to the specific cluster for the Southern European countries, the new Member- 
States are found to be distributed between either of the two remaining groups. This result, 
which was considered to be somewhat surprising by Ferreira and Figueiredo (p.24-5), 
diverged from the conclusions of MacMenamim (2003) and Soede et al. (2004). Given the 
 
40 According to Bambra (2005b:209), the liberal sub-group confirmed the claim of Castles and Mitchell 
(1993).  
41 The five welfare domains and the indicators can be seen in Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005: 8, Table 2). 
42 The shortage of available data explains the exclusion of Luxembourg, Cyprus and Malta. 
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use of the same technique by the former and very similar time horizons by both, the cause 
of the divergence is most likely to be the different approaches to the concept of the welfare 
state. 
3.2. What emerges from the comparison of the various studies? 
 
The comparative analysis of the thirteen studies has been conducted at the level of the 
respective results obtained, i.e., the number of models identified and the placement of the 
countries in each cluster (see Table 14 below).  The conclusions are grouped according to 
the critiques of the ´three worlds`, taking into account the differences presented by the 
thirteen studies, at both conceptual and methodological levels. With regard to the number 
and composition of the clusters, four conclusions can be drawn:  
 
a) Excluding the hybrid cases, most notably Holland (by a wide consensus), and the non-
defined cases, all of the studies confirm the existence of at least three regimes, 
notwithstanding that the designations vary; in total, six types are identified (the “three 
worlds” of Esping-Andersen, together with Radical, Southern and Eastern European); 
 
b) The existence of a specific regime for the four countries of Southern Europe is supported 
in three studies (Saint Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Soede et al., 2004; Ferreira and 
Figueiredo, 2005), while its classification in the conservative regime is confirmed by 
Powell and Barrientos (2004). The classification of Italy, which is the most frequently 
studied Latin country, in the conservative/continental regime is supported in a further six 
studies;   
 
c) The classification of Eastern European countries is somewhat inconclusive. Soede et al. 
(2004) and MacMenamim (2003) find a justification for a specific regime, the latter author 
proposing it as one of six or more regimes, whereas Ferreira and Figueiredo’s (2005) 
solution is to place the countries in one of the two “Old Europe” clusters.  
 
d) The USA, Germany and Sweden can be identified respectively as prototypes of the 
liberal, conservative and social-democratic regimes. 
 
Turning now to the critique aimed at Esping-Andersen’s analytical option. In this respect, 
what conclusions can be drawn from the empirical studies?  Once again, the results are 
inconclusive: Gal (2004) and Bambra (2005a) validate partially the ´three worlds`, whilst 
Bambra (2005b) and Kautto (2005) obtain clearly different groupings. Furthermore, the 
latter two studies confirm the internal inconsistency of the welfare states as argued by 
Kasza (2002). 
 
Lastly, and in relation to the validation of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) typology which was 
the objective of the majority of the studies, one can agree with Arts and Gelissen (2002) 
who affirm that Esping-Andersen’s typology “neither passes the empirical tests with flying 
colours, not dismally fails them”(p.153). However, it should be stressed that none of the 




Table 14 – Empirical studies: number of clusters and cluster assignment 
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1. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
4. Undefined: Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, UK 
 
1. Liberal: Canada, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
4. Radical: Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, UK 
 
1. Liberal: Canada, Japan, Switzerland, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, France, Italy 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
4. Hybrid European: Belgium, Germany, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK 
5. Radical: Australia, New Zealand 
 
1. Liberal: Canada, Australia, UK, USA 
2. Conservative: Belgium, France, Germany 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Norway, Sweden 
4. Hybrid: the Netherlands 
 
1. A ´service` group: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Sweden, UK  
2. A ´transfer` group: Austria, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands 
3. A ´mix` group: Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain 
 
1. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Island, New Zealand, UK, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden 
4. Southern: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 
1. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, USA 
2. Continental: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK 
3. Late developers: Check Republic, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, 
Spain 
 
1. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Ireland, UK, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, Sweden 
4. Mediterranean: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
5. Eastern European: Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia  
6. Hybrid: the Netherlands, Norway 
 
1. Liberal: Australia, Canada, Ireland, Japan, Switzerland, UK, USA 
2. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Spain, 
Portugal 
3. Social-democratic: Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden 
 
1. Low score: Spain, the UK 
2. Middle-to-high score: Australia, Germany, France, Israel 
3. High score: Denmark, Sweden 
    





Table 14: Continued 
 






























2 or 3  
1. Low score: Australia, USA 
2. Middle score: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland 
3. High score: Canada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK 
 
1. Liberal: Australia, Japan, USA 
2. Liberal subgroup: Ireland, New Zealand  
3. Conservative: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy 
4. Conservative subgroup: Germany, the Netherlands, the UK 
5. Social-democratic: Finland, Norway, Sweden 
 
 
1. ´Old Europe` group: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia 
2.  ´New Europe` group: Ireland Estonia, , Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
3.  Mediterranean group: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain 
 





The comparative analysis of the various welfare states and the attempt to identify an ideal 
typology in the context of their differences and similarities has aroused great interest 
among academics and researchers around the world during the past fifteen years.  
 
The point of departure was the celebrated work, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 
published by Esping-Andersen (1990). Many were critical of Esping-Andersen’s approach 
to the welfare state in terms of the specific social programmes, in addition to his 
conceptualisation in terms of aggregated social expenditure. In reply, Esping-Andersen 
developed his analysis of the welfare state from a political economy perspective and based 
on the concept of the welfare regime. Abiding by the criteria of decommodification and 
social stratification, three types of regime were identified: liberal, conservative and social-
democratic, each of which were differentiated by the historical and political evolutions 
experienced in the various industrialised countries. The empirical test conducted by Esping-
Andersen, based on the combined decommodification index, confirmed his theoretical 
typology.  An evaluation based on the indices of each of the social programmes or on the 
establishment of different dividing points would have produced a different outcome as we 
have seen. Contrary to Esping-Andersen’s suggestion, the clusters obtained from a social 
stratification index basis would fail to confirm the ´three worlds`. Nevertheless, it is curious 
that these aspects have been overlooked in the extensive literature that followed Esping-
Andersen’s work. 
 
From among the critiques of the ´three worlds`, we have highlighted three in this paper: on 
the basis of the abundant research generated (the classification of various countries and the 
analytical option) and on the basis of their more radical nature (questioning the very 
concept of the welfare regime). On this matter, we are reminded of Esping-Andersen’s 
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(1999) argument on the irrelevance of certain critiques, due to some conceptual confusion, 
in addition to his new classification. 
 
Of the various typologies that aimed to determine the number of ideal types of welfare state 
– at least four – as well as the grouping of each country, we have examined and compared 
those of Ferrera (1996), Bonoli (1997) and Korpi and Palme (1998). Whilst the large 
number of alternative classifications has increased the possibilities for conducting empirical 
tests, it has not yielded a satisfactory clarification, which can be exemplified by the fact that 
certain studies have merely attributed new names to already existing regimes.  
 
The attempt to identify the ideal typology has brought about an even more abundant 
production of empirical studies, characterised by diverse conceptual and methodological 
options. This diversity was strikingly apparent in the set of thirteen empirical studies that 
were examined in the present paper, requiring great caution in comparing the results 
obtained. It should be borne in mind that many of the studies seeking to test the validity of 
the ´three worlds` were embarked upon only after the implementation of reforms in the 
welfare states, in particular in the social security systems.   
 
A concise survey of the studies permitted us to draw several conclusions on the number of 
regimes and the placement of countries:   i) all of the studies confirm the existence of at 
least three regimes; in total, six different types are identified (the three regimes of Esping-
Andersen, and additionally, the Radical, Southern and Eastern European); ii) the existence 
of a specific regime for the Mediterranean countries is proposed in three studies (Saint 
Arnaud and Bernard, 2003; Soede et al., 2004; Ferreira and Figueiredo, 2005), while its 
classification in the conservative regime is supported by Powell and Barrientos (2004); (iii) 
the classification of the eastern European countries, which were not examined by Esping-
Andersen, is somewhat inconclusive: Soede et al. (2004) and MacMenamim (2003) argue 
for a specific regime, whereas Ferreira and Figueiredo (2005) propose the distribution of 
the countries between two clusters of the EU-15; iv) the USA, Germany and Sweden can be 
identified as prototypes of the liberal, conservative and social-democratic regimes 
respectively.    
 
Those studies which took as their motivation the critique of Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
analytical focus display diverging results: Gal (2004) and Bambra (2005a) partially validate 
the ´three worlds`; Bambra (2005b) and Kautto (2005) obtain different groupings. In the 
case of the latter study, the internal inconsistency suggested by Kasza (2002) is apparently 
confirmed.  
 
Finally, in relation to the validation of the ´three worlds`, which was the purpose of the 
majority of the studies, it is possible to agree with Arts and Gelissen’s (2002) affirmation 
that the theory of regimes “neither passes the empirical tests with flying colours, not 
dismally fails them”(p.153).  
 
In general terms, we are able to conclude that if, on one hand, the classification of Esping-
Andersen is simultaneously confirmed and contested, on the other hand, none of the other 
typologies presented has succeeded in improving on its evaluation. However, rather than 
the construction of new theoretical typologies, it would be of greater value to conduct an 
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empirical evaluation, preferably across a long time horizon, in order to enable the analysis 
of the potential effects of the reforms carried out, particularly in Europe, on the 
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